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Attitudes guide behavior. The social-
cognitive approach to decision-making 
has been building on this assumption 
for almost a century (Allport, 1935). In 
this field, the model of reasoned action 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974) was probably 
the most influential advance in describ-
ing the relation between attitudes and 
behavior. Accordingly, attitudes are the key 
predictor of behavioral intentions. They 
are formally described as a function of a 
linear integration of evaluations and prob-
abilities (beliefs). The attitudinal part of 
the model dovetails with the subjectively 
expected-utility (SEU) approach to risky 
decision-making (Edwards, 1954). In line 
with attitude–behavior models, preferences 
are stable attitudes toward behaviors.
After its formation, an attitude can be 
stored in memory in association with the 
attitude object (e.g., Fazio, 1990; Wilson 
et al., 2000; Betsch, 2005). Attitude stor-
age opens the path to stability. If a person 
re-encounters an attitude object, she can 
look up her attitude in memory and use 
it for subsequent judgment and choice. 
Individual preferences should be stable to 
the extent that the person relies on stored 
attitudes.
This so-called “file-drawer” notion 
(Wilson and Hodges, 1992), however, has 
been challenged by empirical evidence. 
Attitudinal responses in risky and non-
risky choice domains were shown to be 
susceptible to a variety of task conditions. 
Krosnick and Schuman (1988) showed that 
response order, question wording and for-
mat systematically affect attitude judgments 
irrespective of their subjective importance, 
extremity, and certainty. In a similar vein, 
empirical violations of the axioms of deci-
sion theory challenged the notion that 
preferences are stable (e.g., framing effect, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
The temporary construal approach, in its 
extreme version, assumes that individu-
als always construct attitudes on the spot 
(Schwarz, 2000). In this view, stability is a 
function of the situation. In stable  situations 
the sample of information (salient stim-
uli, activated knowledge) is invariant. 
Consequently, attitudinal judgments and 
behaviors are expected to be stable. If the 
situation changes, however, the sample of 
information changes as well and so will atti-
tudes and behaviors. Accordingly, attitudes 
are transient constructions. Therefore, pref-
erences cannot be stable.
The focus on variability, however, is 
prone to yield an un-representative picture 
of human behavior. Numerous examples of 
behavioral rigidity can be cited, both from 
everyday observation and controlled stud-
ies. Individuals regularly obey norms, repeat 
their routines, and fancy the same things 
two days in a row. Correspondingly, there 
is a bulk of psychological research demon-
strating stability, especially in the field of 
learning. In their famous demonstrations of 
the Einstellung-Effect, Luchins and Luchins 
(1959) showed that only a few implementa-
tions of a problem-solving strategy suffice to 
induce a tendency to maintain the strategy 
even when less costly strategies are adequate. 
In recurrent risky choices, prior experience 
fosters maintenance of behavioral options 
(Betsch et al., 2001) and decision strategies 
(Bröder and Schiffer, 2006), even following 
changes in the pay-off structure that ren-
der the routine a maladaptive choice. A few 
behavior repetitions (less than 10) suffice to 
induce counter-intentional relapse errors1 
in subsequent choice (Betsch et al., 2004). 
In research on attitude– behavior models, 
Bentler and Speckart (1979), for instance, 
suggested including past behavior as an 
additional predictor in the Fishbein–Ajzen 
model.
How is it possible that there is evidence 
for both variability and stability in behav-
ior? Many studies on variability employ 
tasks and judgment domains in which 
individuals lack behavioral experience. In 
contrast, studies on stability often assess 
behavior in recurrent tasks. It is widely 
acknowledged, however, that experience 
matters. Decisions based on experience 
yield different results from those in one-
shot situations (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004). 
Thus, one might conclude that preferences 
should be labile in new situations and sta-
bilize with behavioral experience.
Note, however, that the behavioral 
invariance observed in recurrent and 
experienced-based situations is not a suf-
ficient condition for inferring preference 
stability. According to attitude theory, pref-
erential stability requires that the attitude 
remains stable and guides choice. Repetitive 
experience, however, could merely result 
in increasing the association between a 
stimulus and a response. If this were the 
case, we would expect stability in recurrent 
situations and variability when situations 
change in the sense that the learned stimu-
lus is no longer present. Explaining stability 
in stable situations does not necessitate the 
assumption of a stable attitude because it 
is the stimulus situation and not the atti-
tude that might induce stable responses. 
Stimulus-directed choice is likely to occur 
if a behavior has been repeated so frequently 
in the past that it has been “frozen into 
habit” (James, 1890/1950; Verplanken and 
Aarts, 1999). Habits are responses that are 
instantiated automatically upon recogniz-
ing the associated stimulus. Indeed, there is 
evidence that highly frequent behavior rep-
etition can outperform attitudes and inten-
tions (Ouellette and Wood, 1998). On the 
other hand, the fact that habits are imple-
mented in a stimulus-directed fashion with-
out involving goals and intentions (Wood 
and Neal, 2007) does not speak against the 
possibility that attitudes can also become 
stable with behavior repetition and may 
systematically guide intentional decisions.
Two conditions must be met to justify the 
assumption that repetition paves the way to 
preference stability. First, previous behav-
ior must increase the association between 
an attitude and an object. Accordingly, 
response latencies for attitude judgments 
1A relapse error occurs if the actor performs a routine 
behavior against his or her intention to deviate from 
this routine.
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r = 0.66). For infrequent behaviors, a reverse 
pattern for old (r = 0.70) and new situations 
(r = 0.59) was obtained.
Not only the predictive power of past 
choices but also the predictive power of 
attitudes seems to stabilize with behav-
ior repetition over time and situations. 
Generalization indicates that behavior 
repetition appears to stabilize preferences 
beyond creating mere stimulus–response 
associations. Hence, one might conclude 
that stability in preferences is a function of 
behavioral repetition and storage processes.
Attitude research, however, suggests 
that consolidation of attitude–behavior 
relations in memory is not a sufficient con-
dition for stability because the cognitive 
processes at the time of decision matter as 
well. Individuals can use different styles of 
thinking involving more or less delibera-
tive effort (Evans, 2008). Economists often 
assume that individuals must think care-
fully to arrive at good (rational) decisions 
(Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001, for a discus-
sion). Thus, violations of the axioms of 
rationality (e.g., preference reversals) may 
be attributed to shallow thinking under 
flawed incentive structures.
Does thorough thinking foster stabil-
ity? When considering theorizing and 
empirical results from attitude research, 
one arrives at the opposite prediction. In 
his MODE-model, Fazio (1990) assumes 
that reliance on stored attitudes increases 
the less a person is motivated and able to 
think carefully about the decision. Under 
high motivation and in the absence of 
constraints, the individual is expected to 
engage in a new assessment of risks and 
benefits. In line with this prediction, indi-
viduals have been found to change prefer-
ences when “thinking too much” (Wilson 
and Schooler, 1991). Accordingly, individ-
uals should be more likely to rely on prior 
attitudes if they make decisions without 
investing much cognitive effort (Betsch 
and Glöckner, 2010).
From the social-cognition approach, we 
can conclude that preferences (attitudes) 
can indeed stabilize and yield stability in 
judgment and decision-making under 
certain conditions. Stability is probably a 
joint function of memory and judgment 
processes. We should expect stability to 
increase with behavior repetition in the past 
and when individuals do not think much 
before making their decisions.
were found to decrease with increasing fre-
quency of prior activation of the attitude 
object (Fazio et al., 1986). Most important, 
studies using a conceptual priming tech-
nique show that activation of an attitude 
object can result in automatic activation of 
attitudes (Fazio et al., 1986).
Second, if it is truly the attitude that can 
guide behavior in intentional decisions, 
than we should observe a generalization of 
the preferred behavior to conditions that 
deviate from those under which the behav-
ior has been learned. Generalization should 
occur especially for frequent compared to 
infrequent behaviors because in the for-
mer the behavior–attitude association is 
strong. Such transfer effects could not eas-
ily be accounted for by a stimulus–response 
model.
The following demonstration provides 
evidence of a generalization of strong atti-
tudes. Sixty undergraduates from various 
majors at the University of Erfurt received 
vignettes involving food choices in every-
day settings. Half of the behaviors were 
frequently performed in the past, such as 
drinking coffee or tea at breakfast. Others 
were infrequent such as foreign meals 
offered on the exchange-students day. 
Measures of attitudes toward the alterna-
tives (nine-point rating scale: dislike–like) 
and choices were assessed twice with a 
2-week delay in between. At the second 
assessment, participants were randomly 
assigned to two conditions. Half of the par-
ticipants received descriptions of new situ-
ations mostly atypical of everyday settings. 
The other half received the same descrip-
tions that they were exposed to at the first 
assessment. Even though the situations dif-
fered between the two conditions, the set of 
alternatives was identical.
Mean correlations (r) between attitudes 
and choices over vignettes were generally 
above 0.50 and significant – both within 
and between the two times of measure-
ment. First-time attitudes and choices were 
equally strongly associated with second-
time choices. These results indicate that atti-
tude–choice relations were quite strong and 
stable over time. More revealing, however, 
are the results from a comparison of old and 
new situations. For frequent behaviors, the 
correlations between the first-time attitudes 
and choices and second-time choices were 
substantially larger in new (mean r = 0.90) 
as compared to old situations (mean 
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